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ABSTRACT
Background. The literature on Theory of Mind (ToM) in antisocial samples is limited despite
evidence that the neural substrates of theory of mind task involve the same circuits implicated in
the pathogenesis of antisocial behaviour.
Method. Eighty-nine male DSM-IV Antisocial Personality Disordered subjects (ASPDs) and 20
controls (matched for age and IQ) completed a battery of ToM tasks. The ASPD group was
categorized into psychopathic and non-psychopathic groups based on a cut-oﬀ score of 18 on the
Psychopathy Checklist : Screening Version.
Results. There were no signiﬁcant group (control v. psychopath v. non-psychopathic ASPD) dif-
ferences on basic tests of ToM but both psychopathic and non-psychopathic ASPDs performed
worse on subtle tests of mentalizing ability (faux pas tasks). ASPDs can detect and understand faux
pas, but show an indiﬀerence to the impact of faux pas. On the face/eye task non-psychopathic
ASPDs showed impairments in the recognition of basic emotions compared with controls and
psychopathic ASPDs. For complex emotions, no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences were detected largely
due to task diﬃculty.
Conclusions. The deﬁcits in mentalizing ability in ASPD are subtle. For the majority of criminals
with ASPD and psychopathy ToM abilities are relatively intact and may have an adaptive function
in maintaining a criminal lifestyle. Our ﬁndings suggest the key deﬁcits appear to relate more to
their lack of concern about the impact on potential victims than the inability to take a victim
perspective. The ﬁndings tentatively also suggest that ASPDs with neurotic features may be more
impaired in mentalizing ability than their low anxious psychopathic counterparts.
INTRODUCTION
The antisocial personality disorders [DSM-IV
antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and
psychopathy] are a group of overlapping dis-
orders of personality that are associated with
signiﬁcant intra- and inter-personal dysfunction.
There is increasing recognition in the litera-
ture that ASPD and psychopathy are complex
constructs and that both disorders comprise a
constellation of symptoms and behaviours.
While the DSM-IV category of ASPD does not
provide a description of speciﬁc emotional dif-
ﬁculties, Hare’s (1991) construct of psychopathy
emphasizes interpersonal features such as cal-
lous unemotional style and lack of empathy
particularly in its factor 1 item content.
There are a number of theories relating to the
development of antisocial behaviour, the most
prominent of which are the punishment/low
fear theories (Lykken, 1995) ; the Response
Modulation deﬁcit hypothesis (Patterson &
Newman, 1993; Newman, 1998) and more
recently the ‘Violence Inhibition Mechanism’
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(VIM) deﬁcit proposed by Blair (1995). In the
latter model psychopathic behaviours and low
empathy are perceived to be the result of a fail-
ure of basic emotions (e.g. fear) to result in
autonomic arousal and the inhibition of ongoing
behaviour.
To date, studies of antisocial behaviour
have concentrated largely on the role of the
ventromedial cortex (Eslinger &Damasio, 1985;
Damasio et al. 1994; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000;
Dolan & Park, 2002). Case reports of prefrontal
brain injury indicate clear associations with
the development of antisocial behaviour and a
pseudo-psychopathic presentation (Benson &
Blumer, 1975; Damasio, 1994). The dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex mediates executive functions
such as the ability to plan, monitor and inhibit
pre-programmed behaviour (Smith & Jonides,
1999). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is
implicated in inhibitory control but is particu-
larly associated with the ability to learn to in-
hibit a behaviour which is no longer positively
rewarding, i.e. to reverse a behavioural pattern
that has changed from positively to negatively
rewarded (Damasio, 1994; Dias et al. 1996;
Rolls, 1997). Dysfunction in these brain regions
could account for the variety of interpersonal
and behavioural problems seen in ASPD and
psychopathy and there is now reasonable em-
pirical evidence based on neuropsychological
testing that ASPDs exhibit a variety of executive
deﬁcits (Gorenstein, 1982; Dinn & Harris, 2000;
Dolan & Park, 2002) compared with healthy
controls.
Studies in animal and humans also demon-
strate a potential role for the amygdala in
emotional reactions and the modulation of the
acquisition of fear motivated learning (Galla-
gher & Holland, 1994). Blair & Frith (2000)
suggest that the amygdala may be a core
component of the neural circuit that mediates
the VIM and have proposed that early amyg-
dala dysfunction may result in the development
of core psychopathic (aﬀective-interpersonal)
traits. Amygdala lesions in humans reduce
the ability to acquire conditioned autonomic
responses (Bechara et al. 1995) and impair
the capacity to recall emotional material
(Cahill et al. 1995). Functional imaging studies
conﬁrm the notion that the amygdala is acti-
vated in aﬀectively loaded visual stimuli par-
ticularly fearful faces (Breiter et al. 1996;
Morris et al. 1996; Phillips et al. 1997; Blair et al.
1999).
It has been proposed that patients with anti-
social personality disorders particularly those
with psychopathic traits have deﬁcits in empa-
thy (Blair, 1995). Empathy is an essential com-
ponent of eﬀective social communication and
prosocial behaviour (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987;
Hoﬀman, 1987). It involves role or perspective
taking (Perry et al. 2001) and the ability to at-
tribute thoughts and feelings to self and others
[i.e. ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM; Premack &
Woodruﬀ, 1978) or ‘mentalizing’ (Frith et al.
1991)]. Recent developments in moral psy-
chology emphasize the role of emotion and
empathy in moral development and behaviour
(Gilligan, 1993).
Available studies examining ToM ability in
antisocial subjects have produced inconsistent
ﬁndings with some (Gough, 1948; Chandler,
1973; Widom, 1976; Lee & Prentice, 1988;
Hughes et al. 1998) but not all (Blair et al. 1996;
Richell et al. 2003) reporting impairments.
Early work by Blair et al. (1995, 1996) suggested
subjects characterized as prototypical psycho-
paths using Hare’s criteria have impairments
in moral/conventional distinctions (Blair et al.
1995), but not on simple ToM stories compared
with non-psychopathic criminals (Blair et al.
1996). Recently, Richell et al. (2003) have also
failed to show a psychopathy-speciﬁc deﬁcit on
an advanced ToM task devised by Baron-Cohen
et al. (1997, 2001).
As the latter studies do not include a healthy
control comparison group it is premature to
conclude that antisocial populations do not
have deﬁcits in ToM.
We investigated empathy and ToM in
ASPDs, with and without psychopathy, and
healthy controls (screened for Axis I pathology
and substance misuse). We hypothesized that
ASPDs will not exhibit gross deﬁcits in ToM
tasks assessing basic mentalizing ability, but
that subtle deﬁcits would be apparent on more
challenging ToM tasks tapping the emotions
and feelings of others. We also hypothesized
that ‘psychopathic ’ ASPDs would be less im-
paired on ToM tasks than non-psychopathic
ASPDs in the light of Blair’s (1996) report
that psychopathy assessed using Hare’s (1991)
criteria was not associated with deﬁcits in men-
talizing ability.
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METHOD
Subjects
Eighty-nine male, right-handed subjects, aged
between 18 and 55 years, meeting DSM-IV cri-
teria for ASPD [Structured Clinical Interview
for Diagnosis for Axis II disorder (SCID-II;
First et al. 1997)] were recruited from prison
(HMP Garth, n=79) and a maximum-security
hospital (Ashworth Hospital). Subjects were
detained for a minimum of 12 months and had a
mean age of 36.73 years (S.D.=9.85 years) and,
the mean number of years spent in education
was 11.97 (S.D.=0.82). Full-scaleNational Adult
Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982) IQ scores
were within the normal range (see Table 1). All
subjects were incarcerated for violent oﬀences,
but had extensive criminal histories for ac-
quisitive oﬀences. A single trained rater made
psychopathy ratings based on ﬁle review and
semi-structured interview using the Psychopathy
Checklist : Screening Version (PCL-SV; Hart
et al. 1995).
Twenty male healthy volunteers were re-
cruited from ancillary staﬀ working in secure
psychiatric hospital settings and prisons. Con-
trols were screened for Axis II pathology
(SCID-II; First et al. 1997). The mean age of
controls was 33.60 years (S.D.=4.86 years), and
mean years of education 12.0 (S.D.=0.56). There
were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between controls
and antisocial subjects in terms of age, IQ or
years in education (see Table 1).
All Subjects (healthy controls and antisocial
subjects) were screened for current Axis I
disorder including aﬀective disorder and
schizophrenia (SCID-I; First et al. 1996),
learning disability, signiﬁcant head injury and
drug or alcohol abuse. No subjects were on
psychotropic medication, which might have
aﬀected neuropsychological test performance.
Procedure
The North West Region’s Multi-Centre Re-
search Ethics Committee approved the study.
Written informed consent was obtained from
all subjects. No subjects received ﬁnancial re-
muneration for participation.
Subjects completed the NART as a proxy
measure of intellectual function. Participants
were tested individually in an interview room
attached to their ward/wing. Testing typically
took place within one session and all tasks were
completed as part of a larger battery of tests.
Psychopathy assessment
Psychopathy was assessed using The Psychop-
athy Checklist : Screening Version (PCL-SV;
Hart et al. 1995) and was based on ﬁle review
and interview with the ASPD incarcerated
group.
Factor 1 of the PCL-SV reﬂects aﬀective
and interpersonal traits and factor 2 reﬂects
behavioural or social deviance components of
psychopathy. Subjects scoring greater than 18
on the PCL-SV were rated as psychopathic.
Table 1. General characteristics of sample, mean (S.D.)
Controls Non-psychopaths Psychopaths
General characteristics (n=20) (n=59) (n=30) F p value
Age 31.65 (7.7) 33.03 (5.7) 30.97 (5.44) 1.25 0.29
NART 106.9 (11.8) 101.55 (13.36) 105.4 (13.8) 1.61 0.20
Years of education 12.20 (0.61) 12.05 (0.79) 11.96 (0.18) 0.76 0.46
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (n=17) (n=57) (n=28)
Perspective taking 16.70 (3.29) 16.87 (5.08) 16.21 (6.43) 0.65 0.86
Empathic concerns 17.88 (2.89) 17.98 (4.92) 17.64 (6.06) 0.04 0.95
Fantasy 13.35 (5.07) 13.33 (5.07) 14.25 (6.65) 0.27 0.76
Personal distress 9.35 (5.23) 11.56 (5.12) 10.82 (4.60) 1.34 0.26
Psychopathy checklist : screening version (n=20) (n=59) (n=30) T
Factor I — 6.38 (2.21) 9.40 (1.52) x6.68 <0.001
Factor II — 7.73 (1.88) 9.64 (1.46) x5.32 <0.001
Total — 14.16 (2.37) 19.23 (1.06) x11.1 <0.001
df=2, 99.
NART, National Adult Reading Test.
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Subjects scoring less than 17 were considered
non-psychopathic.
Psychometric measures of empathy/perspective
taking
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis,
1980) is a 28-item, self-report measure of empa-
thy with 4 subscales containing 7 items each
rated on a Likert-type scale The perspective
taking subscale is a measure of the ability to
appreciate another’s point of view. The Personal
Distress scale measures the extent to which an
individual can share negative emotions with
others. The Fantasy Scale measures the ability
to identify with imaginary characters. The
Empathic Concern scale measures the ability to
sympathize with less fortunate others.
Davis (1980) reports internal consistencies
ranging from 0.68 to 0.79 for the subscales, and
test–retest reliabilities ranging from 0.61 to 0.81
over interval of between 60 and 75 days. The
construct validity of the scales has been sup-
ported through correlations with other empathy
measures (Davis, 1983).
ToM tasks
ToM was assessed using tasks developed by
Stone et al. (1998). Each task consisted of a
short story followed by a number of questions
relating to that story. Stories were printed onto
A4-sized paper using font 16. Each story was
read out and then placed in front of the partici-
pant, removing any memory load from the
tasks. Participants were advised to listen to the
story and to refer to the printed version if
necessary. They were told that the subsequent
questions would relate to various aspects of the
story including the characters beliefs and/or
feelings.
As ToM follows a stereotyped sequence of
development, which may break down at any
stage, the tasks ranged from simple false-belief
problems to faux-pas tasks, which index more
subtle ToM deﬁcits.
First-order false belief tasks
These tasks require the participant to infer that
someone holds a mistaken belief, which diﬀers
from their own true belief. Stories usually in-
volved the movement of an object from the
location at which the person left it to another
location whilst the person is out of the room.
The participant was asked questions relating
to the beliefs of the person on his or her return.
These included a ‘belief ’, a ‘reality ’ and a
‘memory’ question.
The belief question requires an understanding
of another’s mental state whilst the reality and
memory questions ensure that the participant
has comprehended and remembered the story
correctly.
Second-order false belief tasks
These tasks test a person’s ability to understand
what the ﬁrst person thinks about what a second
person thinks. In these stories the ﬁrst person
leaves an object somewhere and then leaves the
room. While the ﬁrst person is out of the room
he/she looks back and sees a second person
moving the object without the second person
realizing that the ﬁrst person has seen this. The
participant is then required to represent not
only each person’s belief about the location of
the object, but also the second person’s mis-
taken belief about the ﬁrst person’s belief state.
Four questions were asked including a belief,
reality, memory and a physical inference ques-
tion. The latter was included to address a poss-
ible confound in the ﬁrst-order false belief tasks,
whereby the belief question is both the only
question to ask about mental states and the only
question that requires an inference rather than
just understanding and memory of the story.
Faux pas tasks
A faux pas occurs when someone says some-
thing that they should not have said without
realizing that they should not have said it. An
understanding of faux pas requires a person to
represent the mental state of both the speaker
and hearer of the faux pas, i.e. it requires an
understanding that the speaker does not realize
they should not have said it, and that the person
on the receiving end of the faux pas will feel hurt
or insulted. Subjects were presented with a story
containing a faux pas. They were then asked a
series of questions that address detection and
understanding of the faux pas, the mental state
of the listener and the mental state of the
speaker. An additional control question as-
sessed general ability to follow the story and an
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empathy question addressed how the people in
the story might have felt.
Facial emotional expression task
Participants’ abilities to attribute both basic
emotions and complex mental states to an actor
based on her facial expression were assessed
using a set of standardized photographs pro-
duced by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997). The seven
basic emotions of: happy, sad, angry, afraid,
surprise, disgust and distress were used, with
happy, surprise and angry each photographed
in two poses to create a set of 10 images. For
the complex mental states : scheming, guilt,
thoughtful, admiring, quizzical, ﬂirting, bored,
interested and arrogant were used with inter-
ested photographed in two poses, again to cre-
ate a set of 10 pictures. A second set of the
images was also used in which all but the eye
area of each photograph was covered. All
40 A4-sized, black-and-white photographs
were presented to each participant in a folder,
one photograph per page in the order : basic
emotions – full face, complexmental states – full
face, basic emotions – eyes only, complex men-
tal states – eyes only. At the bottom of each
photograph were printed two emotion/mental
state terms: the target word that described the
mental state that the actor was posing and a
‘foil ’. In each case the foil had the same valence
(positive or negative) as the target word and also
belonged to the same super-ordinate semantic
category as the target word, i.e. if the target was
a basic emotion then so was the foil.
Participants were instructed to work through
the folder and for each stimulus to decide, as
quickly as possible, which of the two words
under each photograph best described what the
actor was thinking or feeling. The task was a
forced-choice so that no answer other than one
of the two terms underneath the photograph
was accepted.
Data analysis
The data were analysed using SPSS version 11.1
(Chicago, IL). Group assignment in the patient/
prisoner cohort of ASPDs was based on a
PCL-SV cut-oﬀ score of>18 (psychopaths) and
<17 (non-psychopaths). A cut-oﬀ score of 18 is
comparable to a >30 cut-oﬀ for prototypical
psychopathy using the PCL-R. Group (control,
non-psychopaths, psychopaths) comparisons
on all tasks were made using parametric and
non-parametric analyses of variance (Kruskal–
Wallis test) where appropriate. Post hoc testing
using least signiﬁcant diﬀerence method was
used for normally distributed data. Not all
subjects completed all tasks and the diﬀering
numbers participating in each task are shown in
the subsequent tables.
RESULTS
Characteristics of the sample
The PCL-SV total and subscale scores and the
mean scores on the IRI are shown in Table 1.
Among the ASPD sample, as a whole, the mean
PCL-SV score was 15.87 (S.D.=3.1) with factor
1 scores of 7.40 (S.D.=2.45) and factor 2 scores
of 8.44 (2.02). As expected based on the cut-oﬀ
scores for categorization psychopaths had sig-
niﬁcantly higher total and PCL factor 1 (inter-
personal/aﬀective) and 2 (social deviance) scores
than non-psychopaths.
There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
controls, psychopaths and non-psychopaths
in the total or subscale scores on the self-
report Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; see
Table 1).
ToM tasks
There were no signiﬁcant group (controls, psy-
chopaths, non-psychopaths) diﬀerences in the
number of subjects passing the ToM ﬁrst and
second-order false beliefs tasks. That is there
were no notable deﬁcits in the belief, reality and
memory components of each task, indicating
that all subjects followed the task and showed
similar mentalizing abilities at least in basic
ToM tasks (see Table 2).
Faux pas tasks
On the faux pas task, there were also no signiﬁ-
cant group diﬀerences in the number of subjects
who correctly identiﬁed all faux pas questions
(Kruskal–Wallis x2=2.47, df=2, p=0.29) or
the number correctly answering who had com-
mitted the faux pas (x2=0.19, df=2, p=0.90).
Across all 10 stories, there were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in mean scores for detection
[F(2, 102)=0.50, p=0.60] or understanding who
committed the faux pas [F(2, 102)=0.74,
p=0.47]. (See Table 3.)
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There were, however, signiﬁcant group dif-
ferences on the assessment of the mental state of
the listener [F(2, 102)=4.85, p=0.01] and the
mental state of the speaker [F(2, 102)=12.48,
p=0.001]. Post hoc testing indicated that both
psychopaths and non-psychopathic criminals
were impaired on this aspect of the task com-
pared with controls.
There were no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences in
the control question [F(2, 102)=1.69, p=0.1],
indicating that subjects did not diﬀer in their
overall understanding of the story. For the em-
pathic understanding question, however, there
were signiﬁcant group diﬀerences [F(2, 102)=
8.06, p=0.001]. Post hoc testing indicated that
both non-psychopathic and psychopathic crimi-
nals were impaired on this component of the
task compared with controls.
Baron-Cohen faces task
Basic mental states
We compared performance on the whole face
and eyes only task in the overall sample and
across groups. Data was based on the number of
subjects choosing the correct mental state term
for each stimulus. Overall, subjects were able to
discriminate correct mental states more accu-
rately based on faces rather than eyes (Wilcoxon
z=x4.7, p<0.001). Diﬀerences were signiﬁcant
for all groups. See Table 4 for median and
percentile scores on this task.
Using the Kruskal–Wallis test, there were
signiﬁcant group diﬀerences for basic faces
(x2=8.40, df=2, p<0.01) and basic eyes task
(x2=6.14, df=2, p<0.05). Post hoc testing
using the Mann–Whitney test indicated that
there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
controls and non-psychopaths on basic faces
(z=x2.57, p<0.01) and basic eyes (p<0.05).
Non-psychopaths were also signiﬁcantly worse
than psychopaths on basic faces (z=x1.96,
p=0.05).
Complex mental states
In the overall sample, Wilcoxon testing in-
dicated that the whole face was better than the
eyes in the recognition of complex mental states
(z=x1.92, p=0.05). Using the Kruskal–Wallis
test, there was a trend towards signiﬁcant group
diﬀerences for complex faces (x2=5.31, df=2,
p=0.07), but no signiﬁcant diﬀerences using the
complex eyes task (x2=1.24, df=2, p=0.54).
Post hoc testing indicated that the signiﬁcant
diﬀerences were solely attributable to diﬀerences
between controls and non-psychopaths for
complex faces (z=x2.26, p<0.05).
Table 3. Faux pas task, mean (S.D.) scores
Controls
(n=20)
NP
(n=57)
P
(n=28) F p value
Detected 8.35 (1.63) 8.29 (1.80) 8.72 (1.92) 0.50 0.61
Understood 8.30 (1.62) 7.76 (2.14) 8.24 (2.16) 0.74 0.48
Mental State
I 8.25 (1.65) 6.21 (2.80) 6.36 (2.56) 4.85 0.01
II 8.25 (1.74) 4.69 (3.0) 4.92 (2.98) 12.48 0.000
ToM
Control 11.0 (0.0) 10.71 (0.70) 10.7 (0.70) 1.69 0.18
Empathy 9.0 (1.12) 7.21 (1.81) 7.80 (1.82) 8.06 0.001
df=2, 202; P, psychopaths; NP, non-psychopaths; ToM, Theory
of Mind.
Mental State I=Speaker; Mental State II=Listener.
Table 2. Theory of mind task ; number of sub-
jects passing each component of the task, n (%)
Controls
(n=20)
Non-psychopaths
(n=59)
Psychopaths
(n=30)
First order
Belief 19 (95) 55 (93) 29 (96.6)
Reality 19 (95) 54 (91.5) 27 (81)
Memory 19 (95) 56 (95) 28 (93.3)
Second order
Belief 19 (95) 53 (89.8) 29 (96.6)
Reality 20 (100) 54 (91.5) 30 (100)
Memory 20 (100) 57 (96.6) 29 (96.6)
Interference 20 (100) 58 (98.3) 30 (100)
Table 4. Face/eye emotional cognition task
Controls
(n=20)
Non-psychopaths
(n=56)
Psychopaths
(n=28)
Basic faces
Median (quartiles) 10 (9–10) 9 (7.5–9) 9 (8–10)
Mean (S.D.) 9.2 (1.23) 8.41 (1.36) 9 (1.08)
Basic eyes
Median (quartiles)* 9 (8–9.75) 7.5 (6–9) 7.5 (6–9)
Mean (S.D.) 8.6 (1.27) 7.84 (1.37) 7.71 (1.53)
Complex faces
Median (quartiles) 9 (8–10) 8 (8–9) 9 (8–9)
Mean (S.D.) 8.9 (1.07) 8.23 (1.19) 8.48 (1.15)
Complex eyes
Median (quartiles)# 9 (8–9) 8 (7–9) 8 (7–9)
Mean (S.D.) 8.41 (1.39) 8.0 (1.54) 8.17 (1.13)
* Basic eyes, Wilcoxon: controls z=x1.70, p<0.08; non-psycho-
paths z=x0.81, p=0.41; psychopaths z=x1.21, p=0.23.
# Complex eyes, Wilcoxon: controls z=x1.70, p<0.0; non-
psychopaths z=x0.81, p=0.41; psychopaths z=x1.21, p=0.23.
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Repeated measure analysis of variance on
faces with complexity as a factor (basic v. com-
plex) revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of group
[F(2, 102)=4.7, p=0.01], a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
complexity [F(1, 102)=4.36, p=0.04], but no
signiﬁcant complexityrgroup eﬀect [F(2, 102)
=0.39, p=0.69]. Post hoc testing conﬁrmed
the diﬀerence was between controls and non-
psychopaths.
A similar analysis using the eyes task revealed
a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of group [F(2, 102)=
1.83, p=0.16], complexity [F(1, 102)=0.58,
p=0.44] and grouprcomplexity interaction
[F(2, 102)=1.02, p=0.36].
More than 50% of all subjects within each
group correctly recognized all emotions except
for the SCHEMING v. Arrogant in eyes. The
same emotion was recognized equally well,
however in the faces component of the task.
Non-psychopathic ASPDs compared with
controls tended to have signiﬁcant problems
recognising DISTRESS v. Sadness (x2=4.45,
df=1, p<0.05) and ARROGANT v. Guilt in
faces (x2=5.60, df=1, p<0.01). Psychopathic
and non-psychopathic ASPDs were both im-
paired on the recognition of THOUGHTFUL
v. Arrogant in eyes compared with controls
[psychopaths v. controls (x2=4.89, df=1,
p<0.05) ; non-psychopaths v. controls (x2=
6.12, df=1, p<0.01)].
DISCUSSION
We compared an incarcerated sample of crimi-
nal ASPD subjects with healthy controls on a
battery of ToM tasks previously used in other
disorders characterized by deﬁcits in social and
emotional information processing, e.g. autistic
spectrum disorders (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997)
and in some studies in psychopathic populations
(Blair et al. 1996). We selected a violent criminal
population as we anticipated higher prevalence
rates of ASPD and psychopathy than would
be found in community studies (Hare, 1998).
Furthermore, we recruited from an incarcerated
population that was subject to random drug
screens in order to minimize the likelihood of
current substance misuse problems.
We screened the ASPDs and controls to ex-
clude Axis I pathology and medication use to
ensure that our ﬁndings could not be attributed
to co-morbid psychopathology or substance
misuse. As we were particularly interested in
diﬀerences between psychopathic and non-
psychopathic criminals with ASPD, subjects
were rated using the screening version of the
Psychopathy Checklist as this measure is in-
creasingly recognize as useful in discriminating
those with callous-unemotional traits or core
psychopathic traits from those who do not have
these characteristics. We used the US cut-oﬀ of
>18 to assign a diagnosis of psychopathy. We
did not select a score <12 as representative of
non-psychopathic status due to the low numbers
scoring in this range. However, we repeated the
analysis using the latter cut-oﬀ for non-psycho-
pathic status and found essentially similar
ﬁndings. The PCL-SV was not used in healthy
controls as it relies heavily on ﬁle reports
of criminal/antisocial behaviour, which are not
applicable to staﬀ controls as they had criminal
records checks and were screened for Axis II
pathology.
Psychometric measures of empathy/perspective
taking
We were unable to detect any signiﬁcant group
diﬀerences on any of the subscales of the IRI
including perspective taking and empathic con-
cern. The latter ﬁnding may reﬂect deception
in the antisocial group but also, possibly, the
impact on staﬀ controls of working with oﬀen-
ders. Indeed our controls had lower than ex-
pected scores for empathy compared to those
cited by Davis (1983) for men in the general
population.
Previous studies comparing control and
pathological samples on self-report empathy
measures have produced inconsistent ﬁndings,
with some (Hogan, 1969; Ellis, 1982) but not
all (Kendall & Deardorﬀ, 1977; Kaplan &
Arbuthnot, 1985; Lee & Prentice, 1988) report-
ing diﬀerences between oﬀender and healthy
control groups. Our ﬁndings also ﬁt with reports
that role-taking impairments are less obvious
in adult criminals (Hickey, 1972; Widom,
1978) than delinquents (Chandler, 1973; Lee &
Prentice, 1988). This may well be developmen-
tal, but it also suggests that adult criminals may
require role-taking ability in order to manipu-
late others. Overall, our ﬁndings and the general
literature in this ﬁeld casts doubt on the validity
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of self-report empathy measures in criminal
populations (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987).
ToM tasks
Similar to Blair et al. (1996) we did not ﬁnd
gross impairments in ﬁrst and second order false
beliefs in the psychopathic and non-psycho-
pathic adult criminals. Previous studies in low
functioning autistic groups have demonstrated
impairments in ﬁrst and second order false
beliefs (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Perner et al.
1987). By contrast, subjects with Asperger’s
Syndrome can pass ﬁrst and second order tasks
(see Baron-Cohen et al. 1997). Diﬀerences in
IQ may account for these discrepant ﬁndings.
It is also possible that there are ceiling eﬀects
in ToM tasks in criminal samples of at least
average intellectual ability. Deﬁcits may be seen
in less able samples with antisocial behaviours
or in delinquents.
Faux pas task
In this study we did not detect any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the groups in their ability to
detect and understand a faux pas. This suggests
that the ASPD groups do not have gross im-
pairments in the cognitive ability to represent
the mental state of the speaker and listener.
However, psychopathic and non-psychopathic
ASPDs were both impaired in their responses to
questions relating to how the speaker and lis-
tener might have felt once the faux pas had been
made. This ﬁnding suggests diﬃculty in truly
empathizing with the characters in the stories or
an indiﬀerence to the impact of the faux pas on
the speaker or the listener. In the majority of
cases ASPDs justiﬁed their responses with con-
crete statements, e.g. ‘ the speaker was simply
saying what they thought as the curtains were
disgusting’.
Basic and complex mental states – facial/eye
expression
As in previous studies (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al.
1997) we found that all our groups were able
to detect a range of mental states both basic
and complex from whole facial expressions and
that faces provide signiﬁcantly more infor-
mation than eyes for basic emotions. This ﬁts
with Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1997) concept of a
‘Language of the eyes ’. For complex mental
states seeing the eyes or the face did not reveal
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent scores among the groups.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) have shown that high
functioning patients with autism and Asperger’s
syndrome have impairments in complex mental
states particularly in the eyes alone task com-
pared with healthy controls. In this study, we
found that our healthy control sample per-
formed similarly to Baron-Cohen et al.’s 1997
normative sample. Over half the sample in all
groups had diﬃculty recognizing SCHEMING
in eyes but not in faces. This suggests a task
diﬃculty eﬀect and indicates some complex
emotions require more information for accurate
identiﬁcation. Since this study this task has now
been modiﬁed to address some of these diﬃ-
culties (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001).
We found non-psychopathic ASPDs per-
formed worse than controls and psychopathic
ASPDs on some, but not all, basic emotions.
This was most notable for DISTRESS v.
Sadness and ARROGANT v. Guilt in faces and,
when GUILT was the target emotion in eyes.
Our ﬁndings largely support Blair et al.’s (1995)
report that psychopathic oﬀenders have speciﬁc
impairments in their emotional attributions
relating to guilt presented in story format. As
the eye task is more diﬃcult than the face task, it
is possible that task diﬃculty is an important
confound for complex emotions such as guilt.
Recently, Richell et al. (2003) reported that
psychopathic and non-psychopathic criminals
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly on a revised version
of the Eye task. However, they did not report on
individual emotions, so comparisons are diﬃ-
cult. One other possible explanation for the
discrepant ﬁndings between studies using this
task is that subjects diﬀer in the degree of their
neuroticism and their early socialization. In this
sample non-psychopathic ASPDs had the most
diﬃculty in interpreting emotional expressions.
They were also those who would be character-
ized as ‘secondary psychopaths’ (neurotic
psychopaths) based on Blackburn’s (1998) ty-
pology and who had come from adverse family
backgrounds. Previous studies have shown that
aggressive children from deprived family back-
grounds respond to distress in others with
aggression (Dodge, 1982). Others (e.g. Stevens
et al. 2001) have shown that children with
psychopathic traits have impairments in the
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recognition of sad and fearful emotions rather
than anger and happiness. Future studies need to
consider the developmental pathways that result
in adult ASPD and psychopathy and the role
of anxiety and neuroticism in the misinterpret-
ation of emotional expression and mentalizing
ability.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that ASPDs with
psychopathic traits do not have marked diﬃ-
culties in reading basic or complex emotions
from facial expression. In fact, they perform
remarkably similar to health controls if not
slightly better in some areas of complex
emotional recognition.
Our work adds to the literature by clarifying
that psychopathic and non-psychopathic oﬀen-
ders have mild impairments in higher order
ToM tasks compared with controls and these
largely reﬂect a diﬃcultly in empathic under-
standing. The study also highlights the diﬃculty
of reliance on self-report measures of empathy.
Limitations of this study include the relatively
small sample size of the control group and re-
liance on correctional staﬀ controls. A further
limitation is the possibility that there may have
been a ceiling eﬀect for the basic ToM tasks as
they were originally designed for use in younger
samples. The transparency of self-report empa-
thy assessments is a further challenge in criminal
samples where social desirability bias may be a
factor.
Future studies need to use psychophysiologi-
cal or more covert measures of emotional
responsivity and empathy. As the amygdala and
orbitofrontal cortex have been implicated in the
neural network sub-serving empathic under-
standing and emotional recognition functional
imaging studies are needed to clarify the nature
of any reported aﬀective empathic deﬁcits in
antisocial populations. A recent event-related
fMRI study by Berthoz et al. (2002) in healthy
subjects indicates that transgressions of social
norms activate the prefrontal and temporal
regions previously reported to play a role in
representing mental states of others. Similar
work is required in antisocial samples. This
study concentrated on a highly selected sample.
Further studies are therefore required in anti-
social groups with and without co-morbid psy-
chopathology and substance misuse to assess
the impact of co-morbid disorders on mentaliz-
ing ability.
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